

## Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097  
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S E C R E T STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

EXDIS, KOOLAID, FOR ANDERSON FROM TARNOFF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: MISCELLANY

1. NAMIBIA: YOU MAY WISH TO PASS ON THE FOLLOWING TO MR. VANCE ON NAMIBIA. DAVID AARON CHAIRED AN SCC MEETING THIS MORNING (JULY 14) WITH STATE/DOD/CIA/OMB PARTICIPATION. BILL MAYNES REVIEWED THE STATUS OF WORK ON NAMIBIA. THE UPSHOT WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE U.S. WOULD PLAN TO PROVIDE THE INITIAL AIRLIFT. DOD SAID THEY WOULD PAY FOR IT. IN ADDITION, DAVID AARON NOTED THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO PAY PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM WHICH COULD BE POSED TO PARTICIPATION IN UNTAG OF AN EASTERN EUROPEAN CONTINGENT. NATO COUNTRY PARTICIPATION (WHICH IS NEEDED FOR UNTAG EFFECTIVENESS) COULD EVOKE A WARSAW PACT INSISTENCE ON PARTICIPATION. THE SCC AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF MR. VANCE WERE TO NOTE THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM WHEN HE MEETS WITH HIS CONTACT GROUP COLLEAGUES SUNDAY EVENING IN BONN. WALDHEIM, WHO WILL HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTUALLY PICKING THE FORCE, WILL HAVE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

TO TAKE THIS PROBLEM INTO ACCOUNT.

TO RECAPITULATE, WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS FROM THE FOLLOWING GOVERNMENTS OF A WILLINGNESS TO PROVIDE CONTINGENTS TO UNTAG: FINLAND, DENMARK, CANADA, INDIA, ROMANIA AND JAPAN (BUT ONLY INTERNAL AIR TRANSPORT SUPPORT). THERE WAS NO DISAGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSITION THAT AN

IRANIAN GENERAL WOULD BE AN IDEAL CHOICE AS HEAD OF THE MILITARY SIDE OF UNTAG -- GIVEN SOUTH AFRICA'S DEPENDENCE ON IRANIAN OIL.

2. CAT TALKS: BELOW IS THE TEXT OF THE PRESS RELEASE FOR MONDAY, JULY 17, THAT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS:

BEGIN TEXT: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE THEIR MEETINGS IN HELSINKI, FINLAND, BEGINNING JULY 18, 1978, ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE LIMITATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE TWO COUNTRIES HELD PREVIOUS MEETINGS ON THIS TOPIC IN WASHINGTON FROM DECEMBER 14 THROUGH 19, 1977, AND IN HELSINKI FROM MAY 4 THROUGH 8, 1978.

AMBASSADOR L.I. MENDELEVICH WILL REPRESENT THE SOVIET SIDE. LESLIE H. GELB, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WILL REPRESENT THE AMERICAN SIDE. END TEXT.

3. BELOW ARE Q'S AND A'S THAT CHRIS, TONY AND I HAVE CLEARED FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S PRESS SPOKESMAN TO USE AFTER MAKING THE CAT ANNOUNCEMENT ON MONDAY. IF MR. VANCE, GEORGE VEST OR YOU HAVE COMMENTS ON THESE, PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

Q1. ISN'T IT TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE TO UNDERTAKE ANOTHER NEGOTIATION WITH THE RUSSIANS IN THE MIDST OF THE SHCHARANSKIY TRIAL, ON AN ISSUE OBVIOUSLY LESS IMPORTANT THAN SALT?

A1. -- THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE HAVE CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED OUR DEEP CONCERN WITH THE VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE SOVIET UNION. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT FAIL TO SEEK TO REDUCE THE RISKS OF WAR IN AN INCREASINGLY DANGEROUS WORLD THROUGH THE PURSUIT OF SOUND AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL.

-- THEY ARE A CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSIONS BEGAN LAST DECEMBER. THIS ROUND OF TALKS HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR A NUMBER OF WEEKS.

Q2. WHAT SPECIFICALLY DOES THE U.S. EXPECT TO ACHIEVE IN THESE TALKS?

A2. THESE TALKS ARE AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OUR EFFORT TO DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH TO ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT

AMONG ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENTS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD EVENTUALLY HELP TO RESTRAIN ARMS SALES. SPECIFICALLY, WE WOULD HOPE TO LIMIT ADVANCED AND EXPENSIVE WEAPONS AND AVOID THE ADVERSE POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS WHICH MAY RESULT FROM TRANSFERS TO VARIOUS REGIONS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE LEGITIMATE DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS TO BE MET.

Q3. WHAT PROPOSALS DOES THE U.S. PLAN TO MAKE?

A3. I HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF THE U.S. POSITION. THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

Q4. ARE THESE TALKS HELD ON A REGULAR BASIS, OR DO THEY TAKE PLACE ONLY UPON SPECIAL REQUEST BY ONE SIDE?

A4. AT THE LAST ROUND OF TALKS IN MAY OF THIS YEAR, IT WAS AGREED THAT REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETINGS WOULD BE HELD.

Q5. ARE YOU SEEKING AN AGREEMENT AT THE UPCOMING ROUND?

A5. WE DO NOT EXPECT TO REACH A FORMAL AGREEMENT AT SUCH AN EARLY STAGE, SINCE WE ARE DISCUSSING A HIGHLY COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, WE HOPE TO FIND SUFFICIENT COMMON GROUND TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD CONCRETE RESTRAINT MEASURES.

Q6. DO YOU BELIEVE THE SOVIETS ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN ARMS TRANSFER LIMITATIONS?

A6. WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY OUR CONSULTATIONS TO DATE. THE TALKS HAVE BEEN SERIOUS AND BUSINESSLIKE. AS WAS INDICATED IN THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AFTER THE LAST ROUND, BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED ON THE URGENCY OF THE PROBLEM AND ON THE NEED TO HOLD REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETINGS TO EXPLORE CONCRETE MEASURES THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO LIMIT ARMS TRANSFERS.

Q7. DO YOU PLAN TO INCLUDE OTHER ARMS SUPPLIERS IN THESE TALKS?

A7. THERE ARE NO PLANS TO INCLUDE OTHER SUPPLIERS IN THIS ROUND OF TALKS. HOWEVER, THE ULTIMATE SUCCESS OF ARMS TRANSFER RESTRAINT WILL DEPEND ON THE COOPERATION OF ALL MAJOR SUPPLIERS, AS WELL AS RECIPIENTS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

Q8. WILL YOU INCLUDE ARMS RECIPIENTS IN YOUR DISCUSSIONS?

A8. WE DO NOT PLAN TO INCLUDE ARMS RECIPIENTS IN THE U.S.-

SOVIET TALKS AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, WE RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR COOPERATION WILL BE NECESSARY IF THE ARMS RESTRAINT EFFORT IS TO BE SUCCESSFUL. WE WELCOME AND SUPPORT INITIATIVES BY RECIPIENT NATIONS SUCH AS THE RECENT REAFFIRMATION BY THE EIGHT SIGNATORIES OF THE AYACUCHO DECLARATION OF THEIR COMMITMENT TO ARMS RESTRAINT (ARGENTINA, BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA, CHILE, ECUADOR, PANAMA, PERU AND VENEZUELA).

Q9. HOW DO THESE TALKS RELATE TO THE RECENT UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT?

A9. THE TALKS ARE FULLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE PROGRAM OF ACTION ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. THE PROGRAM OF ACTION CONTAINS A CALL FOR CONSULTATIONS AMONG MAJOR ARMS SUPPLIERS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRIES ON THE LIMITATION OF ALL TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

Q10. DO YOU SEEK IN THESE TALKS TO BRING ABOUT AN END TO ARMS SALES?

A10. NO. WE ARE SEEKING TO RESTRAIN THE TYPES AND QUANTITIES OF TRANSFERS WHICH CAN STIMULATE ARMS RACES, INCREASE THE RISK OF CONFLICT, ADVERSELY AFFECT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS, OR PLACE A HEAVY ECONOMIC BURDEN ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MEET THE NEEDS OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES FOR ARMS NECESSARY TO THEIR DEFENSE.

4. MELISSA WELLS: MELISSA SUFFERED A STROKE OF UNKNOWN SERIOUSNESS IN VIENNA TODAY. SHE IS HOSPITALIZED THERE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 178455 TOSEC 080097

IN STABLE BUT GUARDED CONDITION. MR. VANCE KNOWS HER, AND YOU MAY WANT TO KEEP HIM INFORMED. IF NEEDED, YOU CAN PROBABLY GET THE BEST PROGRESS REPORTS DIRECTLY FROM EMB

## Message Attributes

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